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Abstract 
 
Following the Hatfield accident in October 2000, the cost of running Britain’s 
railways has increased very sharply, leading to considerable debate about whether 
current cost levels are reasonable. This paper seeks to inform this debate by assessing 
post-Hatfield cost and TFP levels (2000/01 to 2001/02) against the historical 
precedents set by British Rail and the early experience of the newly-privatised 
industry (1963 to 1999/00). The results show that industry cash costs rose by 47% 
between 1999/00, the last financial year before Hatfield, and 2001/02 - but, 
surprisingly, with train operating costs (TOCs and freight operators) accounting for 
42% of this growth. The results also show that the post-Hatfield cost spike is 
unprecedented when compared against historical benchmarks, indicating that recent 
cost rises cannot simply be explained by the investment cycle or so-called “bow-
wave” effects. Furthermore, according to the preferred models, post-Hatfield 
productivity levels are lower than at any time over the last four decades. Analysis of 
long-term data on quality and safety measures indicates that an excessive focus on rail 
safety may offer part of the explanation for the recent cost growth, with the emphasis 
on safety also resulting in less attention to punctuality and reliability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The privatisation of British Rail has been the source of much controversy over the 
eight years of private sector ownership since 1997. Although Pollitt and Smith (2002) 
point to some early successes – in the form of significant operating cost savings – the 
picture has changed markedly since the Hatfield derailment in October 2000. This 
accident led to a reappraisal of the level of maintenance and renewal activity required 
to sustain the network, and resulted in a sharp increase in infrastructure costs. 
However, whilst attention has focused on infrastructure, the data presented in section 
5 of this paper shows that train operator (TOC) costs have also been on the rise in 
recent years. Taken together, the data shows that (annual) total industry cash spend 
increased by £2.9bn (47%) in real terms between 1999/00 and 2001/02.  
The post-Hatfield rise in industry costs poses a major financial challenge for the 
government, and in turn raises the following question: how can policymakers 
determine whether post-Hatfield cost and productivity levels are reasonable, and 
whether increased funding to the railways should be permitted? The Office of Rail 
Regulator (ORR) has recently completed (December 2003) a review of the finances of 
Britain’s rail infrastructure provider, Network Rail (2002/03 Interim Review)2. As 
part of this review the ORR commissioned a range of studies aimed at answering this 
question in respect of infrastructure costs. In particular, internal benchmarking proved 
                                                 
1
 Andrew Smith is a Lecturer in Transport Economics at the Institute for Transport Studies, University 
of Leeds. This paper was prepared as part of the author’s PhD thesis, undertaken at the Judge Institute 
of Management, University of Cambridge, and funded by Network Rail. The author acknowledges 
comments from David Newbery, Ian Marlee, Michael G. Pollitt and John Smith, as well as 
considerable assistance from Alvaro Angeriz, David Cooke, Richard Goldson, Duncan Hannan, Nigel 
Salmon and Richard Smith. All remaining errors are the responsibility of the author. 
2
 Railtrack owned and operated Britain’s rail infrastructure from April 1994 before being placed into 
administration in October 2001. Network Rail subsequently took over from Railtrack in October 2002.  
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to be a useful approach in defining the scope for Network Rail to reduce costs by 
eliminating intra-company cost differences (see Kennedy and Smith (2004); and LEK 
(2003)).  
However, a key difficulty for the ORR has been the lack of external benchmark 
information against which to make objective and conclusive judgements about 
Network Rail’s productivity levels, based on hard evidence concerning best practice 
achieved elsewhere. Quantitative comparisons with international operators have 
proved illusive due to lack of comparable data, whilst comparisons with other 
privatised industries only provide information about productivity trends; and not 
levels (see section 2 for a fuller discussion of these studies). On the train operation 
side, the SRA has carried out TOC-on-TOC comparisons, but we are not aware of any 
comparisons with external benchmarks. The government’s dissatisfaction with the 
outcome of the 2002/03 Interim Review and with the lack of cost control in the 
industry more generally, was one of the key factors behind its decision to announce a 
further review of the structure of railways in January 2004. 
Of course, the question raised above – whether post-Hatfield cost levels are 
reasonable – leads to a second and important question: what is the cost, at the total 
industry level, of running Britain’s railways in the post-Hatfield environment? 
Following industry restructuring, with the creation of getting on for a hundred new 
companies, answering this question turns out to be non-trivial. The difficulties are 
compounded during the period after the Hatfield accident as a result of large increases 
in intra-industry transfer payments (between Railtrack and the TOCs; and between 
TOCs and customers and the SRA) which potentially frustrate attempts to obtain 
measures of true underlying costs. 
The purpose of this paper is to address both of the questions outlined above. First, 
of all, total rail industry costs are constructed from the relevant company data over the 
post-privatisation period. The post-privatisation period is defined here as 1993/94 to 
2001/02 (see section 4). Second, post-Hatfield (2000/01 to 2001/02) cost and total 
factor productivity (TFP) levels are judged against historical precedents set both by 
British Rail and also the early experience of the newly privatised industry (1963 to 
1999/00). Analysis is presented at the total industry level, due to the considerable 
problems of splitting out infrastructure costs under British Rail. TFP measures are 
derived by estimating a total cost function, using Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated 
(SURE) method, and the econometric results are complemented by analysis based on 
simple unit cost measures and Tornqvist TFP indices. In order to ensure comparability 
over time, a cash-based measure of total costs is used in the analysis (see section 2).  
Of course, in recent years both Railtrack and Network Rail have pointed to the fact 
that much of the existing track was installed during the 1970s, thus creating the need 
for a substantial increase in track renewal activity (both now and in the future)3. Both 
                                                 
3
 These arguments were made during the 2000 Periodic Review and during the 2002/03 Interim 
Review. 
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companies have therefore argued for increased funding to pay for this investment 
“bow-wave”, noting also that the problem has been exacerbated by extended periods 
of under-investment during the British Rail era. It has also been argued (by the ORR 
and others) that investment was insufficient during the early years after privatisation 
(although Railtrack was not funded for a rise in track renewal activity at vesting).  
The impact of the investment cycle, and lagged effects relating from previous 
under-investment, causes some problems for assessing productivity trends over time. 
Traditional productivity measures relate inputs to final outputs (e.g. train km). 
However, variations in intermediate outputs, such as the volume of track renewals, 
will impact on costs4 without necessarily affecting final outputs, and might therefore 
distort productivity measures. This point is particularly relevant in the present context 
since track renewal volumes have increased substantially since the Hatfield accident 
and therefore would be expected to explain part of the recent cost rises5.  
This paper addresses the issue firstly by considering productivity trends in a long-
term context (1963 to date). This approach enables post-Hatfield productivity 
performance to be benchmarked against periods with similar levels of track renewal 
activity (e.g. the 1970s). Secondly, the annual volume of track renewals is explicitly 
added to the cost function specification in order to test the extent to which the 
investment cycle impacts on productivity trends, particularly over the post-Hatfield 
period. The paper also examines changes in key quality and safety measures over the 
period (punctuality, broken rails and passenger fatalities), and asks whether changes 
in these variables can explain movements in cost and productivity levels. 
Previous academic studies have not addressed the questions raised in this paper. 
First of all, the time period considered exceeds those attempted elsewhere. Earlier 
contributions do not extend beyond Hatfield, with most stopping at privatisation. 
Second, many previous studies have been based on physical input measures, such as 
length of track for infrastructure capital, therefore missing the point of the current 
debate, which is concerned with track investment and asset condition. Third, those 
studies using cost-based input measures have used data that is heavily distorted by 
changes in accounting policy over the BR period. These data problems have not 
previously been noted in the literature (see section 2 for further details). Finally, 
previous studies have not considered the impact of track renewals and quality 
measures on costs and productivity levels.  
                                                 
4
 This is not just a problem for cash-based measures of total costs. Between 1975 and 1991/92 most 
track renewal costs were charged to operating costs. As a result, fluctuations in track renewal volumes 
also impact on previous studies using alternative cost measures (i.e. operating costs; or total costs, 
defined as operating costs plus accounting depreciation). Even productivity analysis based on 
“physical” measures are affected by this issue, since they usually include “other material costs” as an 
input (alongside staff numbers and fuel consumption), where other costs include track renewal costs, at 
least for the period 1975 to 2001/02. See section 2 for further details. 
5
 Although there is a separate question as to whether current renewal volumes are at the “correct” level. 
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The paper is arranged in six sections. Sections 2 and 3 review the literature and 
outline the methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Finally, section 5 presents the 
results, whilst section 6 offers some conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review  
 
The relevant literature can be broadly divided into studies commissioned as part of the 
regulatory review processes (2000 Periodic Review and 2002/03 Interim Review), and 
academic contributions. The 2000 Periodic Review studies were described in 
Kennedy and Smith (2004). This section briefly describes the studies carried out 
during the 2002/03 Interim Review, as well as the academic contributions that are 
relevant to the assessment of productivity and efficiency performance on Britain’s 
railways.  
As noted in the introduction, the ORR has so far struggled to establish clear 
external benchmarks against which to assess the Network Rail’s productivity levels. 
This problem first became apparent during the 2000 Periodic Review (see Kennedy 
and Smith (2004)). More recently, during the 2002/03 Interim Review, the ORR made 
some progress in developing international comparisons (see Halcrow, TTCI and LEK 
(2003)). However, this study produced only limited quantitative results, being based 
on identifying areas of best practice for a sub-set of activities, and for a small sample 
of companies.  
The ORR also commissioned a number of other external benchmarking studies 
during the Interim Review. The OXERA (2003a) study benchmarked some of 
Network Rail’s non-core business processes (e.g. HR, Finance) against external 
comparators. However, their analysis dealt with only around £200m of Network 
Rail’s cost base and did not consider the company’s core operations. Accenture 
(2003) sought to benchmark Network Rail’s maintenance and renewal contracting 
processes against international best practice. However, the conclusions of this study 
were based on subjective judgements about the possible savings from achieving best 
practice in this area, expressed in terms of a fairly generic set of principles, and not on 
input-output comparisons with similar rail maintenance / renewal contracts elsewhere. 
Of course, analysis of productivity trends in other industries did not shed any light 
on Network Rail’s relative productivity levels (see OXERA (2003b)). On the train 
operation side, to our knowledge, the SRA has not reported international comparisons 
of TOC costs. To our knowledge, neither of the SRA or ORR has commissioned 
original analysis of costs under British Rail. 
In the academic literature there have been a number of studies concerned with 
measuring productivity and efficiency levels / trends on Britain’s railways, either over 
time, or as part of broader international comparisons. These contributions are listed in 
Tables 1 and 2 below.  
 
 6
Table 1 
Summary of “Britain-only”  
rail productivity / efficiency studies 
Study Sample Inputs used Outputs used 
Bishop and 
Thompson (1992) 
1970-1990. 
British Rail 
Number of employees. 
Other materials. 
Capital (PIM-based6). 
Passenger km. 
Freight (net) tonne km. 
Loaded wagons. 
Affuso, Angeriz 
and Pollitt (2002) 
1996/97 to 1999/00. 
25 TOCs. 
 
 
Number of employees. 
Labour costs. 
Other costs (excl. track). 
Number of rolling stocks. 
Passenger train km. 
Passenger km 
Punctuality index. 
Safety index. 
Cowie (2002) 7 1972-1990; British 
Rail. 1995/96 to 
1998/99; 25 TOCs. 
Number of employees. 
Tractive rolling stock. 
Track kilometres. 
Total train km. 
Pollitt and Smith 
(2002) 
1988/89 to 1999/00. 
Privatised industry. 
Operating costs (excluding 
depreciation). 
Passenger train km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Kennedy and Smith 
(2004) 
 
1995/96 to 2001/02. 
Seven Railtrack 
zones. 
Maintenance and track 
renewal costs. 
Quality measures. 
Passenger train km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Track km. 
 
 
Table 2 
Summary of British Rail productivity / efficiency  
studies based on international comparisons  
Study Sample Inputs used Outputs used 
Nash (1985) 
 
1971 and 1981. 
Europe. 
Number of employees. Total train km, weighted 
and unweighted. 
Deprins and Simar 
(1989) 
1970-1983. 
Europe + Japan.  
Number of employees. 
Number of coaches / 
wagons. 
Energy consumption. 
Route kilometres. 
Total train km. 
Gathon and 
Perelman (1992) 
1961-1988. Europe. Number of employees. 
 
Passenger train km. 
Freight train km. 
Route km. 
Nash and Preston 
(1994) 
1980 and 1990. 
Europe. 
Number of employees. Total train km. 
Oum and Yu 
(1994) 
1978-1989. 
OECD.  
 
Number of employees. 
Energy consumption. 
Number of rolling stocks. 
Way and structures capital 
(PIM-based). 
Passenger km. 
Passenger train km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Freight train km. 
Gathon and 
Pestieau (1995) 
1961-1988. 
Europe. 
Number of employees. 
Number of rolling stocks. 
Route kilometres. 
Sum of passenger tonne 
km and freight tonne km. 
                                                 
6
 Perpetual inventory method. See Christensen and Jorgenson (1969). 
7
 Cowie recognises the lack of direct comparability between the TOCs (train operation only) and BR.  
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Table 2 
(continued from previous page) 
Study Sample Inputs used Outputs used 
Cowie and 
Riddington (1996) 
1992. 
Europe. 
Number of employees. 
Capital (financial measure). 
Passenger train km. 
Service provision index. 
Preston (1996) 1977-1990.  
Europe. 
Variable costs (excludes 
capital costs). 
 
Passenger train km. 
Freight train km. 
Route km. 
Passenger km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Andrikopoulos and 
Loizides (1998) 
1969-1993. 
Europe. 
Total cost. Includes capital 
costs (historic cost 
depreciation + interest). 
Sum of passenger km 
and freight tonne km. 
Cantos, Pastor and 
Serrano (1999) 
1970-1995. 
Europe. 
Number of employees. 
Energy/materials costs. 
Number of rolling stocks. 
Track kilometres.  
Passenger km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Coelli and 
Perelman (1999 
and 2000) 
1988-1983. 
Europe. 
Number of employees. 
Rolling stock capacity. 
Route kilometres. 
Passenger km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Tsionas and 
Christopolous 
(1999) 
1969-1992. 
Europe. 
 
Number of employees. 
Energy consumption. 
Capital (financial measure). 
Sum of passenger km 
and freight tonne km. 
Cantos, Pastor and 
Serrano (2000) 
1970-1995. 
Europe. 
 
Number of employees. 
Energy consumption. 
Materials consumption. 
Number of locomotives. 
Number of passenger and 
freight carriages / cars. 
Track kilometres. 
Passenger km. 
Passenger train km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Freight train km. 
Christopolous, 
Loizides and 
Tsionas (2000) 
1969-1992 
Europe 
Total cost. Includes capital 
costs (historic cost 
depreciation + interest). 
Total train km. 
Sanchez and 
Villarroya (2000) 
1970-1990.  
Europe 
Variable cost (excludes 
capital cost). 
Passenger train km. 
Freight train km. 
Cantos and Maudos 
(2001) 
1970-1990. 
Europe. 
Operating costs. Passenger km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Cantos, Pastor and 
Serrano (2002) 
1970-1995. 
Europe. 
Operating costs. 
Track kilometres. 
Passenger km. 
Freight tonne km. 
Loizides and 
Tsionas (2002) 
1969-1992. 
Europe. 
Operating costs. 
Capital stock (financial 
measure). 
Passenger km. 
Freight tonne km. 
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As is clear from the tables, the choice of outputs is broadly the same across the 
different studies8. The key features relevant to the present discussion are the choice of 
inputs and the time period covered. The studies listed in Tables 1 and 2 can therefore 
be divided broadly into two types: those that are based on physical measures of inputs 
(e.g employee numbers; network length); and those adopting cost-based input 
measures (e.g. variable or total costs). However, analysis using physical input 
measures is inappropriate in the present context, since the use of network length to 
measure infrastructure capital misses the point of the current debate, which is 
concerned with track investment and condition. Cost-based measures are therefore 
more relevant in the present context. 
The cost-based studies listed in the two tables have been carried out using either 
variable or total costs to measure inputs. However, changes in accounting policy 
during the British Rail period mean that it is inappropriate to consider variable costs 
in isolation. In particular, the accounting treatment of track investment changed twice 
between 1975 and 1992. From 1975 track investment (except major projects) was 
expensed through the P&L each year (previously it was capitalised9). From 1991/92, 
the policy was changed again, with all track investment subsequently capitalised. The 
results of previous studies based on variable cost measures are therefore likely to be 
significantly distorted (the change in 1991/92 saw operating costs fall by about 10%). 
To our knowledge, this point has not been noted previously in the literature10. 
Some studies (Andrikopoulos and Loizides (1998); Christopolous et.al. (2000)) 
have conducted analysis of British Rail productivity based on total costs (operating 
costs plus historic cost depreciation). However, the use of historic cost depreciation to 
measure capital costs represents a serious weakness in an industry with long asset 
lives, and given the many changes in accounting policy over the period11. 
Furthermore, the problems are compounded by inaccuracies in the UIC12 depreciation 
data used in the studies. In the case of Britain, capital grants are (incorrectly) included 
in the depreciation charge reported by the UIC, which distorts the data by plus or 
                                                 
8
 The main differences concern whether “available outputs” (train kilometres) or “revenue outputs” 
(tonne kilometres) are used, whether passenger and freight variables are considered separately, or 
added together, and whether track or route length is included as an output. In the analysis that follows, 
alternative models are presented, with total train kilometres included as the single output, and then 
together with track kilometres. As noted below, the results are little affected if passenger and freight 
train kilometres (or passenger and freight tonne kilometres) are used as separate outputs.  
9
 And charged to the profit and loss account as depreciation over the life of the asset. 
10
 Note that such changes will also affect the computation of capital stock based on the perpetual 
inventory method, as in Bishop and Thompson (1992), since large elements of investment were simply 
expensed each year for significant periods of time. Furthermore, this change will also impact on the 
analysis of total costs including depreciation, since in the year of change, operating costs will change 
by more than the corresponding change in depreciation. 
11
 In 1991/92, as noted above; again at privatisation; and more recently in 2001/02. The impact of the 
2001/02 change was to reduce Network Rail’s depreciation charge from £1,915 to £316m in the year. 
12
 International Union of Railways. 
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minus 60% in some years as a result (see Appendix 1). To our knowledge, this point 
has not been previously noted in the literature13. 
Finally, it should be noted that of the studies listed in Tables 1 and 2 only one 
extends beyond the Hatfield accident (Kennedy and Smith (2004)). However, the 
analysis in the latter study considers productivity trends for infrastructure 
maintenance and renewal activity only, and does not include a comparison with 
infrastructure costs under British Rail14. Of the remaining studies, only three continue 
the analysis beyond privatisation: Affuso, Angeriz and Pollitt (2002); Cowie (2002); 
and Pollitt and Smith (2002) – with each stopping short of the Hatfield accident. This 
means that rail industry productivity levels and trends – for the post-Hatfield period - 
have not yet been reported in the literature.  
Given the above discussion, this paper therefore makes its contribution by first 
computing total industry costs post-privatisation (and post-Hatfield), and then by 
carefully constructing a cost series for the BR period to enable a robust historical 
comparison. The analysis is based on total industry cash costs - operating costs plus 
capital expenditure – a measure that is invariant to the changes in accounting policy 
noted above. Furthermore, this paper adds to previous approaches by also considering 
the impact of fluctuations in annual track renewal activity, as well changes in key 
quality and safety measures over the period (punctuality, reliability, broken rails and 
passenger fatalities). 
 
3. Methodology 
 
Three complementary methodologies are used in section 5 in order to address the 
questions raised by this paper. First of all, unit (total cash cost) measures are 
computed and compared over the period.  
However, since unit cost measures are affected by changes in input prices (average 
wages; fuel prices) as well as productivity movements, Tornqvist indices of total 
factor productivity are also calculated. The Tornqvist index is defined as 15: 
 
¦
¦
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    (1) 
 
where k and l are adjacent time periods, the i and j subscripts denote the m outputs and 
n inputs, the R’s and S’s are the output revenue shares and input cost shares 
                                                 
13
 Furthermore, all studies based on UIC data (based either on variable or total costs) do not distinguish 
between rail and non-rail  (e.g. hotels) costs.  
14
 As noted earlier it is problematic to split BR data accurately between infrastructure and other costs; 
and such data was certainly not available by zone for the BR period.  
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respectively, and the Y’s and X’s are outputs and inputs. Diewert (1992) notes that the 
Tornqvist index is preferred to the other indices (such as the Paasche or Fischer 
indices) based on its relationship with economic theory. However, the Tornqvist index 
requires the assumption of constant returns to scale16 and is therefore unable to 
distinguish underlying productivity changes from productivity movements resulting 
from scale and / or density effects. 
Econometric analysis is therefore required in order to model scale / density 
effects. Econometric estimation also allows the impact of other variables to be tested 
(for example, Hatfield effects, and the impact of renewal volumes on costs17). The 
main analysis in this paper, therefore, is based on the estimation of a total cost 
function using the translog function originally proposed by Christensen, Jorgenson 
and Lau (1973). The translog – one of the so-called flexible functional forms - 
provides a second-order approximation to any twice differentiable cost function. It 
places no a prior restrictions on the input elasticities of substitution, and allows the 
extent of scale economies to vary across different output levels.  
The translog cost function may be written as: 
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where C is a measure of total costs, Yik are the outputs, Wjm are the inputs, and T is a 
time trend representing technological progress18. Conformity with theory requires the 
imposition of symmetry and linear homogeneity of degree one in input prices. 
Symmetry requires that: 
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whilst linear homogeneity requires the following restrictions: 
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15
 See Christensen and Jorgenson (1970). 
16
 See Diewert (1992), p. 190.  
17
 The latter would be hard to incorporate within a Tornqvist index, as there would be no obvious 
weight to attach to the renewals (as an intermediate output), as compared with other final outputs. 
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However, instead of using the linear homogeneity restrictions in equation (4) it is 
more convenient to impose linear homogeneity by dividing costs and input prices by 
one of the input prices (arbitrarily chosen). Note that prior to imposing linear 
homogeneity all data is normalised by the sample means (except the time trend and 
Hatfield dummy variables)19. For the preferred model shown in section 5 (Model 2), 
the normalised translog can therefore be written as20:                                                
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where CASH is total cash costs (operating cost plus capital expenditure), the chosen 
output measures are TRAC (track kilometres) and TTM (total train kilometres) 
respectively (in order to distinguish between economies of scale and density), WL is 
the price of labour, WF is the price of fuel, WMC is the price of materials and capital 
expenditure inputs, PL = (WL/ WMC), PF = (WF/ WMC), T represents technological 
progress and HAT is a dummy to take account of Hatfield effects21. Two alternative 
specifications are also reported in the results in section 5: firstly, excluding the TRAC 
variable from equation (4) (Model 1); and secondly, by adding annual track renewal 
volumes (RENEW) as an additional, intermediate output (Model 3); see Figure 2 
below.  
To improve the precision of the estimates, the above cost function is estimated 
together with the factor share equations derived from Shephard’s Lemma: 
 
TLnTTMLnTRACLnPLnPS tFLL 1211112111 TUUJJE   
          (6) 
TLnTTMLnTRACLnPLnPS tFLF 2221222122 TUUJJE   
 
where SL and SF are the labour and fuel cost shares respectively. The above system of 
equations is estimated using Zellner’s (1962) seemingly unrelated (SURE) method; 
implemented using the statistical package MICROFIT.  
Before proceeding, it has been pointed out in the literature that total cost function 
estimation might not be appropriate in the railway sector, since managers may not be 
                                                                                                                                            
18
 Note that some of the time interaction terms are dropped in the final estimation – see section 5.  
19
 That is, the translog approximation to the underlying cost function is taken at the sample mean.  
20
 Note that symmetry has been imposed in equation (5). Note also that not all of the time interaction 
terms are included in the final estimation – see section 5. 
21
 HAT takes the value 0.5 in 2000/01 (since the Hatfield accident occurred mid-way through 2000/01), 
unity in 2001/02 and zero elsewhere.  
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able to optimally adjust the level of capital input (Caves, Christensen and Swanson 
(1981)). However, in the present context, it can be argued that managers are able to 
control the capital input measure chosen in this paper – namely the level of annual 
capital expenditure in a given year – and therefore that the assumption of total cost 
minimisation can be justified here. Furthermore, the cost impact of different network 
structures and densities are reflected through the inclusion of track kilometres, 
alongside measures of traffic volumes, in the cost function specification (following, 
for example, Friedlaender and Spady (1981)).  
Of course, it should be noted that total cost function estimation is common in 
empirical studies of railway productivity: see, for example, Friedlaender and Spady 
(1981); Caves, Christensen, Tretheway and Windle (1985)22; Andrikopoulos and 
Loizides (1998); Christopolous, Loizides and Tsionas (2000); and NERA (2000)23.  
 
4. Data 
 
This section describes the data set used in the empirical analysis described below; a 
summary of the key data is shown in Table 3 (for further details see Appendix 2).  
 
4.1. Cost information 
 
As noted in the introduction, in this paper the post-privatisation period is taken to start 
in 1993/94, the first year impacted by the restructuring and privatisation process (see 
Pollitt and Smith (2002)). For the pre-privatisation period (1963 to 1992/93 
inclusive), all cost information is taken from the British Rail Annual Reports. 
However, as discussed in section 3, constructing a comparable cost series over the 
British Rail period requires great care. Of course, the decision to use a cash-based 
measure of total costs in this paper makes life easier in this regard. Nevertheless, a 
number of adjustments and assumptions have been made and these are briefly 
outlined below.  
Where relevant, operating grants (e.g. level crossing grants) and capital grants 
(e.g. regional development grants) have been added back to operating and capital 
costs in order to construct measures of gross costs. Non-rail costs, such as those 
associated with hotels, have been excluded from the cost base. In addition, in respect 
of capital costs, non-operational property capital expenditure is excluded from the 
analysis. Finally, Channel Tunnel capital expenditure (completed in 1994/95) is 
excluded from the capital cost series in order to obtain comparable investment 
information as it relates to the existing network, rather than to new routes. 
                                                 
22
 The authors note that they also estimated a variable cost function with similar results. 
23
 Report prepared for the ORR during the 2000 Periodic Review (with Tae Oum and Bill Waters (II)). 
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Table 3 
Data Summary 
Units Pre-privatisation (a) Post-privatisation Post-privatisation
Pre-Hatfield Post-Hatfield
1963 to 1992/93 1993/94 to 1999/00 2000/01 to 2001/02
Cost data
Total cash cost (CASH) £m real (b) 6,095 5,633 8,419
Input prices (c)
Labour (WL) £ real 16,318 25,200 28,740
Fuel (WF) £ real 257.7 139.1 139.6
Materials and capex (WMC) Index (1963=100) 95.7 89.6 93.0
Final outputs / network size
Total train kilometres (TTM) thousands 405,048 410,560 467,872
Passenger train kilometres (PTM) thousands 335,514 381,463 431,550
Freight tonne kilometres (FTON) million 19,757 15,366 18,750
Track kilometres (TRAC) kilometres 37,193 32,704 32,757
Intermediate outputs
Rail kilometres renewed (RENEW); (d number 694 359 990
Quality measures
Broken rails (e) number 745 772 621
Train performance (f) % on time 88.1% 90.0% 81.5%
Passenger fatalities (g) number 42 22 16
Variable names for regression analysis in brackets.  (a) 1992/93 is the last year before the impact of 
privatisation was felt. (b) All financial values in 2001/02 prices, based on the RPI. 
(c) Labour price per head; fuel price per tonne oil equivalent.
(d) See Figure 2 and associated notes and discussion.
(e) Data series starts in 1969. (f) Data series starts in 1974. Train performance is a composite 
measure of the punctuality and reliability data published by British Rail. See Appendix 2 for further details. 
(g) Data starts in 1964
Sources: see section 4 and Appendix 2.
Period annual averages
 
 
 
The post-privatisation period in this paper can be divided into two sub-periods: the 
transitional years (1993/94 to 1995/96) and the post-privatisation period proper 
(1996/97 to 2001/02). Cost data for the transition period (1993/94 to 1995/96), before 
the existence of a full set of privatised company accounts, is constructed from a 
combination of British Rail and Railtrack Annual Reports24 (for 1993/94 and 
1994/95), although cost data for 1995/96 had to be extrapolated. 
For the post-privatisation period proper (1996/97 to 2001/02), industry operating 
costs are computed as the difference between total industry revenue and total industry 
operating profits, following Pollitt and Smith (2002)25. Revenue and profit data is 
readily available from the relevant company accounts (TOCs, freight operators, 
rolling stock companies and Railtrack). Total industry cash costs can then be derived 
for this period by adding the capital expenditures incurred by each element of the 
industry26. Capital expenditure data is available from the relevant company accounts, 
supplemented by data provided by Network Rail. Non-operational (or investment) 
property capital expenditure is excluded from the data, as is capital expenditure 
                                                 
24
 Note that Railtrack was created as a separate company in 1994/95, but was still owned by the 
government until the end of the financial year 1995/96. See Pollitt and Smith (2002) for further details. 
25
 Note that ORR and SRA (non-subsidy) costs are included within the post-privatisation cost base. 
26
 Since intra-industry payments have already been dealt with in arriving at industry operating costs. 
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relating to the Channel Tunnel Rail Link27, in line with the treatment of the first stage 
Channel Tunnel project. 
It should be noted that the calculation of industry operating costs over the post-
Hatfield period (2000/01 and 2001/02) is further complicated by the very large intra-
industry compensation payments resulting from the Hatfield accident and the 2000 
Periodic Review of Railtrack’s access charges28. Detailed analysis was carried out in 
order to ensure that these items did not distort the calculation of industry costs, and a 
number of adjustments were made where required. This analysis was based on 
information provided in the notes to the company accounts, as well as detailed access 
charge revenue data provided by Network Rail. Any assumptions made have been 
verified following discussions with National Express Group29. Further details are 
provided in Appendix 2. 
Note that the lack of available profit data for Railtrack’s suppliers30 means that the 
approach taken here may overstate post-privatisation costs (to the extent that these 
contracts are profitable). However, it is expected that this lack of data should not 
significantly affect the analysis here. First of all, although contractor profit data is not 
available from the company accounts, a significant element of contractor profits / 
losses  - relating to the performance regime - is taken into account in the analysis, 
based on data from Network Rail. Second, there is no evidence that post-Hatfield 
infrastructure cost rises have been driven by increased contractor profit margins. 
Indeed, in 2003, one of Network Rail’s contractors, Jarvis, announced its decision to 
pull out of maintenance activities altogether31 (this development suggests that the 
company was not making excessive profits, and perhaps the reverse) 32.  
Finally, as noted in Pollitt and Smith (2002), any overstatement in costs due to lack 
of data on contractor profits will be partially offset by potential cost understatements 
resulting from lack of data on minor (open access) freight operators. Of course, it 
should also be noted that some activities were also contracted out under British Rail, 
particularly following the sale of BREL33 in 1988.  
 
                                                 
27
 A high speed train link connecting London with the Channel Tunnel. 
28
 These payments include: (1) performance regime compensation paid by Railtrack to the TOCs 
(£590m in 2000/01); (2) TOC penalty payments to the SRA (c. £100m per year); (3) Clause 18.1 
payments made by TOCs to the SRA following the 2000 Periodic Review (£182m in 2001/02); and (4) 
the post-Hatfield passenger compensation package paid by train operators (£70m in 2000/01). See 
Appendix 2 for further details. 
29
 Finance Director, Trains Division. 
30
 The relevant company accounts do not provide sufficient information to derive profits on work 
carried out for Railtrack. 
31
 Furthermore, in the zonal efficiency analysis presented in Kennedy and Smith (2004), the results 
show that the process of re-negotiating the vesting maintenance contracts (which took place at different 
times between 1999 and 2002) had no systematic impact on relative contract payments across the 
zones. Once again, this finding suggests that recent cost increases were not driven by changes in 
contractor profitability resulting from the contract re-negotiation process. 
32
 The announcement by Jarvis was followed, shortly afterwards, by Network Rail’s decision to bring 
all maintenance activities in-house.  
33
 British Rail Engineering Limited (rolling stock production).  
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4.2. Input prices and cost share information 
 
Input price information has been derived from a number of sources. For the pre-
privatisation period, the price of labour (WL) is computed as staff costs divided by 
staff numbers (in line with the approach used in previous studies); with the data taken 
from the British Rail Annual Reports. For the period after privatisation the price of 
labour is based on average salary information for those elements of the industry for 
which data is available, namely TOCs, freight operators, rolling stock companies and 
Railtrack (and, during the transition period, British Rail).  
A fuel price (WF) index for the period up to 1993/94 is calculated based on total 
fuel costs (from British Rail accounts) divided by fuel consumption in million tonnes 
of oil equivalent (data provided by the OECD). Since fuel cost data is not available 
beyond 1993/94, this price index is extrapolated forward based on (pre-tax) price data 
for diesel and electricity prices also provided by the OECD34. The approach taken 
differs from that adopted in previous studies, where the fuel price index has been 
calculated based on fuel costs per train kilometre (see for example, Sanchez and 
Villarroya (2000). Note that, in the latter case, movements in fuel costs resulting from 
changes in fuel efficiency are (incorrectly) counted as price changes.  
The price of materials and capital expenditure inputs (PMC) is based on a relevant 
price index supplied by the ONS (transport equipment) 35. It should be noted that 
some previous studies have used materials cost per train mile to reflect materials 
prices (e.g. Sanchez and Villarroya (2000))36, therefore raising a similar issue to that 
noted in the previous paragraph for fuel costs. Cost share information as between 
staff, fuel and materials and capital expenditure for the BR period is taken directly 
from the BR Annual Reports. After privatisation, cost shares are based on the split 
between operating and capital expenditure costs over the post-privatisation period37.  
 
4.3. Other data 
 
Data for the outputs and quality measures is taken from a variety of sources, 
predominantly the British Rail Annual Reports, National Rail Trends (SRA) and 
Transport Statistics Great Britain. In addition, Network Rail provided data on rail 
renewal volumes and broken rails. See Appendix 2 for further details. The calculation 
of Tornqvist indices also requires information on physical input measures, in order to 
                                                 
34
 OECD, Energy Prices & Taxes: Quarterly Statistics; and Energy Balances of OECD Countries. 
Automotive diesel for commercial / industrial use; electricity for industrial use. 
35
 This is the price index for gross fixed capital formation, and is a combination of indices based on, in 
the earlier years: transport and communications; then transport; and finally transport equipment. Since 
the materials and capital expenditure cost data is already deflated by the RPI, the materials price 
measure is taken to be the ratio of the transport equipment price index to the RPI. 
36
 Other approaches (e.g. Andrikopoulos and Loizides (1998)) appear to have ignored materials cost 
altogether, or else have included them implicitly alongside depreciation within capital costs.  
37
 However, the split of operating costs as between staff, fuel costs and materials is based on the final 
year under British Rail, due to lack of data on these items post-privatisation. 
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separate out the effects of input price and productivity changes. For this purpose, 
equivalent physical measures for labour, fuel and materials / capital, are derived by 
dividing the relevant costs of each element (from the cost share data), by the input 
prices38. 
 
5. Results 
 
As noted in the introduction, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the current debate 
about rail industry cost and productivity levels in Britain, by comparing recent 
experience (since Hatfield, 2000/01 to 2001/02) with historical precedents under 
British Rail and during the first few years of the privatised structure (1963 to 
1999/00). This section sets out the results of the analysis, and is divided into three 
parts. The first part (5.1) compares post-Hatfield cost levels with historical precedents 
based on simple unit cost measures. The second part (5.2) contains the main 
productivity analysis of the paper, consisting of TFP estimates based on total cost 
function estimation as well as Tornqvist indices. The impact of changes in track 
renewal activity (an intermediate output) on observed productivity measures is also 
evaluated.  
The final part (5.3) uses long-term data on quality and safety measures (train 
performance, broken rails and passenger fatalities) to consider whether observed 
productivity trends can be explained by movements in these important variables 
(which are usually ignored in productivity analysis). However, attempts to incorporate 
these measures directly into the total cost function - outlined in section 3 - did not 
produce sensible results. As a result, the analysis in 5.3 is based mainly on simple 
observation of cost / quality data over time. In addition, some econometric work is 
conducted, aimed at understanding the determinants of quality and safety measures 
over the period.  
 
5.1. Unit cost trends on Britain’s railway (1963 to 2001/02)  
 
Before considering more complex approaches to productivity measurement, it is 
worth briefly looking at what has happened to unit costs over the period in question.  
Figure 1 shows total industry cash costs per train kilometre (TTM) between 1963 and 
2001/02. In addition, preliminary estimates of unit costs for 2002/03 and 2003/04 are 
also provided39. The trends in Figure 1 can be described according to a number of 
distinct time periods. First of all, following cost reductions achieved during the large 
                                                 
38
 Note that physical measures are derived from the cost and input price data, and are therefore not 
equivalent to the physical measures used in previous studies  - where, for example, the capital input has 
been represented by track kilometres.  
39
 The estimates for the last two years are based on the increases in Network Rail costs since 2001/02, 
with other industry costs (passenger and freight operators; rolling stock companies) assumed to be 
constant in real terms (since data is not yet fully available beyond 2001/02). 
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scale closure of routes and stations in the 1960s (“The Beeching40 era”), unit costs 
started to rise during the 1970s, reaching a peak in 1979. This growth in cost 
coincided with a major programme of track renewals, comparable with post-Hatfield 
levels (see Figure 2 below), as well as rising (real) fuel and labour prices. 
 
Figure 1 
Total Rail Industry Cash Costs per Train Kilometre 
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Unit costs then fell steadily during the 1980s, interrupted briefly by a period of unit 
cost increases at the start of the 1990s, as the economy moved into recession and 
traffic volumes fell41. This data is in line with previous papers reporting strong 
productivity growth during the 1980s (for example, Bishop and Thompson (1992)). 
However, the cost reductions may also reflect the declining volume of track renewals 
during the period (discussed in more detail below). With the onset of restructuring and 
privatisation – starting in 1993/9442 - unit costs then fell further before rising sharply 
between 1999/00 to 2001/02, following the Hatfield accident. The preliminary 
estimates for 2002/03 and 2003/04 also indicate that unit costs have continued to rise 
since 2001/0243. 
Given the scale of cost increases post-Hatfield, it is informative to look at how 
these breakdown between the different parts of the privatised industry (see Table 4).  
                                                 
40
 Richard Beeching (later Lord Beeching) was appointed chairman-designate of the British Railways 
Board in 1962 and was responsible for two reports on the state of Britain’s railways (see Beeching 
(1963) and (1965)).  
41
 Note that this growth does not reflect Channel Tunnel investment, since the latter is excluded from 
the cost data (as is investment in the Channel Tunnel Rail Link after privatisation). 
42
 1992/93 is the last year unaffected by privatisation – see Pollitt and Smith (2002) for further details. 
43
 See note to Figure 1. 
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Not surprisingly, Table 4 shows that infrastructure costs have increased considerably 
since 1999/00. What is surprising, however, is that TOC costs have also been rising 
sharply since Hatfield, with TOC cost rises accounting for 38% of the total industry 
cost increase over the period. Perhaps of more concern, the data indicates that much 
of the TOC cost hike has come from rises in the basic cost of delivering services44 and 
not simply from higher capital costs relating to new rolling stock. We are carrying out 
ongoing work in this area, aimed at providing a more comprehensive analysis of post-
Hatfield cost drivers45. For now, it is sufficient to note that the data in Table 4 points 
to the need for close attention to cost trends across the whole industry – and not just 
infrastructure. 
Returning to the long-term, industry-level story, it is clear from Figure 1 that post-
Hatfield unit costs (in 2001/02) are much higher than the average over the period (by 
29%) and also substantially higher than the previous peak during the 1970s (by 17%). 
These results suggest that it is difficult to find precedents for post-Hatfield levels of 
cost in the railway industry - based on experience from the last four decades - even 
when today’s costs are compared with periods of very high track renewal activity (for 
example, the 1970s). Of course, before reading too much into these findings, it should 
be noted that the analysis so far is based on simple observation of trends in unit costs, 
and that more advanced methods are required to make conclusive judgements on 
relative productivity levels (Tornqvist and econometric approaches; see below). 
 
Table 4 
Sources of Post-Hatfield Cost Increases 
Rail industry cash costs 1999/00 2001/02 Cost rise Percentage Percentage 
£m, 2001/02 prices Pre-Hatfield Post-Hatfield Growth of total rise
Infrastructure 
Operating costs 1,438 2,049 610 42% 21%
Capital expenditure 1,748 2,826 1,077 62% 37%
3,187 4,874 1,688 53% 58%
Passenger train operation
TOC-own operating costs 1,980 2,491 511 26% 18%
ROSCO operating costs 278 291 13 5% 0%
ROSCO/TOC capital expenditure 312 898 586 188% 20%
2,570 3,680 1,110 43% 38%
Other, including freight 484 595 110 23% 4%
Total industry cash costs 6,241 9,149 2,908 47% 100%
Total costs per train km (£) 13.76 19.32 5.57 40%
Sources: see section 4 and Appendix 2.
 
 
                                                 
44
 That is, TOC-own operating costs in Table 4. 
45
 Clearly staff cost rises play a part, but there remains a large element of unexplained cost rises.  
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5.2. TFP estimates based on total cost function and Tornqvist methods  
(1963 to 2001/02) 
 
The aim of this sub-section is to further investigate long-term rail productivity trends 
in Britain, using the econometric methodology set out in section 3. This method is 
able to take account of both input price changes (e.g. labour / fuel prices) and scale / 
density effects. The econometric results are also checked against Tornqvist indices.  
As noted in the introduction, Network Rail has recently argued the need for 
substantially higher track activity, as track installed in the 1970s comes up for renewal 
(see Figure 2), and to address under-investment during the BR era and immediately 
after privatisation (renewal volumes have also been significantly impacted by the 
West Coast Mainline Project46). It was also noted that these investment cycle effects 
potentially hinder attempts to accurately measure productivity trends over time47 - a 
point that is particularly relevant in the present context due to the sharp rise in track 
renewal activity since Hatfield. This issue is addressed in the analysis that follows, by 
comparing recent costs with earlier periods of significant investment (e.g. the track 
renewal boom in the 1970s, the West Coast upgrade in the 1960s and 1970s, and the 
East Coast upgrade in the 1980s); and by explicitly including track renewal volumes 
as an output variable in one of the cost function specifications (see Table 5 below).  
 
Figure 2 
Track Population by Year of Installation48
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46
 The renewal and enhancement of Britain’s West Coast Main Line (linking London and Glasgow).  
47
 As noted in the introduction, this is not just a problem for cash-based cost measures. 
48
 This data is used as a proxy for annual renewal volumes. However, since some of the track laid in the 
early years of the sample, for example the 1960s, may now have been replaced, this data series may 
understate the true level of renewal volumes during that period. As stated in the note to Figure 2, this 
graph is sourced from Network Rail’s 2003 Business Plan, though has been supplemented with data on 
actual track renewal volumes from Railtrack’s Annual Returns for some of the post-privatisation years. 
 20
It could be argued, of course, that the volume of track renewals is an intermediate 
output and not a final output, and that we should not be concerned with changes in 
this variable. As such, increased track renewals might only be considered valuable to 
the extent that they translate into improvements in measures that are valued by users 
(for example, safety and performance). Nevertheless, changes in the volume of track 
renewal activity will clearly affect cost levels from year to year, and it would 
therefore seem unwise to ignore such effects. Final output (safety and performance) 
measures are considered separately in the next sub-section (5.3). 
Before proceeding it should be noted that the data in Table 4 shows a substantial 
increase in rolling stock capital costs over the period since Hatfield. To the extent that 
this investment represents higher volumes of new rolling stock purchased, relative to 
any previous time period under British Rail, this increase could be used partly to 
justify recent cost increases49. Nevertheless, unless the new rolling stock – an 
intermediate output - translates into real benefits to customers, for example, improved 
reliability and comfort (a case that is not yet proven)50, this justification might still be 
weak. Of course, the rise in rolling stock capital expenditure represents only about one 
fifth of the increase in costs over the period, and the results that follow are not 
materially affected if this increase is excluded from the data51. 
 
(a) Presentation of econometric results 
 
Table 5 shows the econometric results for the three specifications described in  
section 3. The first two specifications (Models 1 and 2) use traditional measures to 
represent the outputs of the railway industry, that is, total train kilometres (TTM)52  
and / or track kilometres (TRAC). Models 1 and 2 do not take account of track 
renewals directly in the regression, although the long-time period chosen for the 
analysis enables productivity levels and trends to be compared over periods with 
similar track renewal volumes (e.g. the post-Hatfield period versus the 1970s). Model 
3 seeks to model track renewal volumes explicitly by including the RENEW variable 
directly in the regression equation as an additional, intermediate output (see Figure 2 
above).  
                                                 
49
 However, it has not been possible to obtain equivalent physical measures against which to measure 
the volumes and unit cost of new rolling stock purchased in previous years. A consistent time series of 
rolling stock investment, for the period of this study, is illusive, since trains were leased by British Rail 
during some time periods (though this issue does not affect the comparability of the total industry cash 
cost measure).  
50
 Given the reliability problems experienced by some new rolling stock introduced in recent years. 
51
 The available data on rolling stock investment suggests that the 2001/02 value was unusual compared 
with previous time periods (though see footnote 49). The sensitivity referred to in the text therefore 
excludes the increase in rolling stock investment between 2000/01 and 2001/02 from the 2001/02 cost 
base. The results show a small improvement in the post-Hatfield productivity index, though this change 
is not sufficient to alter the conclusions of the paper.  
52
 Passenger train kilometres plus freight train kilometres. 
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Table 5 
Restricted Seemingly Unrelated Regression (1963 to 2001/02) 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Cash/WMC)a
Renewals Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
Constant 0.3070 ** 0.1784 ** 0.0874
Ln TRAC - 1.1214 ** 1.4030 **
Ln TTM 0.9613 ** 0.3483 * 0.1371
Ln PL 0.6637 ** 0.6694 ** 0.6601 **
Ln PF 0.0357 ** 0.0283 ** 0.0270 **
HAT (HATFIELD EFFECT) 0.3324 ** 0.2933 ** 0.2364 **
T (TIME TREND) -0.0147 ** -0.0074 ** -0.0024
1/2 (LnTRAC)
2 - 1.5696 3.0358
1/2 (LnTTM)
2 4.2463 ** 6.2238 ** 2.8668
1/2 (LnPL)
2 0.0531 0.1077 0.0959
1/2 (LnPF)
2 0.0311 ** 0.0338 ** 0.0331 **
LnTRAC.LnTTM - -3.7352 -3.4506
LnTRAC.LnPL - 0.1961 0.2029 *
LnTRAC.LnPF - 0.0907 ** 0.0926 **
LnTTM.LnPL -0.3889 ** -0.4798 ** -0.4926 **
LnTTM.LnPF 0.0546 ** 0.0019 -0.0018
LnPL.LnPF -0.0401 ** -0.0296 ** -0.0310 **
LnPL.T -0.0058 ** -0.0058 ** -0.0054 **
LnPF.T 0.0007 * 0.0011 ** 0.0012 **
RENEW - - 0.0699 **
R
2 
statistic 0.8606 0.9312 0.9432
Durbin Watson statistic 0.9258 1.4238 1.626
(a) * = significant at the 5% level; ** = significant at the 1% level.
Traditional Models
 
 
 
For each of the models in Table 5, the translog total cost function is estimated as a 
system, together with the factor share equations (see section 3). Starting with the first 
two (traditional) models, as stated above, railway outputs are represented by TTM (in 
Model 1) and by both TTM and TRAC (in Model 2). The latter specification enables 
the effects of scale and density to be evaluated separately53. Note that passenger and 
freight outputs are not considered separately in order to reduce the number of 
regressors, given the relatively small sample size54. Note also that some of the second 
order time variables are excluded from the regression equation (only those that are 
                                                 
53
 Note that TTM and TRAC are not closely correlated, and their inclusion together is therefore 
unlikely to cause problems of multicollinearity. 
54
 The inclusion of separate passenger and freight outputs also introduces potential collinearity 
problems, and the resulting models do not perform as well in terms of the significance of the output 
variables. However, these models produce almost identical results in respect of the coefficient on the 
time trend and Hatfield dummy variables. The use of a single railway output measure is common in 
previous studies, for example, Andrikopoulos and Loizides (1998), who used the sum of sum of 
passenger kilometres and freight tonne kilometres to reflect railway output in a single measure.  
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statistically significant are retained)55. Hatfield effects are modelled through the 
inclusion of a Hatfield dummy variable (HAT; see section 3). 
Models 1 and 2 performs well in terms of the degree of fit, and the significance of 
the variables, with all first order terms and most of the second order terms being 
significant. Model 1 suggests broadly constant returns to scale, whilst Model 2 
indicates economies of density combined with diseconomies of scale (evaluated at the 
sample mean). Although previous studies of the structure of rail costs in Britain are 
limited in their approach (as described in section 2 above), it is worth considering how 
the scale and density results in this paper compare with those earlier studies. In the 
only previous study to report scale and density economies separately for Britain, 
Preston (1996) also found diseconomies of scale alongside economies of density. The 
remaining literature provides varying results, with US studies suggesting constant 
returns to scale and increasing returns to density, whilst the majority of European 
studies have found evidence of decreasing returns to scale in respect of the British 
network56.  
On balance, Model 2 is preferred over Model 1, for a number of reasons. First of 
all Model 2 is able to distinguish scale and density effects. The finding of decreasing 
returns to scale (alongside increasing returns to density) seems credible, based on the 
evidence from previous studies, and the apparently high cost of expanding capacity57. 
Model 2 also performs better in terms of the R2 and Durbin Watson statistics. Whilst 
the inclusion of TRAC alongside the time trend variable might raise some concerns 
regarding multicollinearity, there is no evidence of any serious effects on the results58. 
However, to reflect the differing interpretations offered by the two approaches, the 
results of both models are referred to in the discussion that follows. 
Turning to the renewals model (Model 3), this specification includes the track 
renewal variable (RENEW) directly in the cost function as an additional output, and is 
identical to Model 2 in all other respects. Note that the coefficient on the RENEW 
variable has a positive sign and is statistically significant, confirming the expected 
positive relationship between renewal volumes and costs (note that only the first order 
term is included in order to conserve degrees of freedom59). Model 3 performs well in 
terms of fit and significance of the variables, although the first order TTM variable 
becomes insignificant with the addition of the RENEW variable. Note, however, that 
                                                 
55
 The inclusion of all second order time variables caused some first order output terms to become 
insignificant.  
56
 That is, where scale and density effects are not reported separately (and only returns to scale are 
reported). See Gathon and Perelman (1992) and Sanchez and Villarroya (2000). On the other hand, 
Andrikopolous and Loizides (1998) reported increasing returns to scale for the British network. 
57
 Furthermore, greater than proportional cost reductions resulting from the Beeching cuts (in the 
1960s) may be expected – relative to track mileage - given the very large number of stations closed 
during that period. 
58
 All of the first order variables are significant, and the standard errors are low. Furthermore, the 
Model 2 results are robust to changes in the sample period.  
59
 The first order renewal variable is positive but insignificant if all interaction terms are included, 
perhaps as a result of the large number of regressors relative to the sample size.  
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the RENEW variable is not statistically significant when included in Model 1 (results 
not shown). 
In line with theory, the estimated cost functions in Table 5 are monotonically 
increasing (since the predicted cost shares are positive), and the Allen-Uzawa own 
(partial) elasticities of substitution, evaluated at the sample means, have the required 
negative signs (see Table 6 below)60.  
 
Table 6 
Allen-Uzawa Partial Elasticities of Substitution 
(evaluated at the sample mean) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Labour input -0.641 -0.461 -0.500
Fuel input -6.324 -5.178 -5.466
Materials and capex input -1.491 -0.980 -1.075
Own elasticities
 
 
 
(b) Discussion of results 
 
So what do the results in Table 5 tell us about comparative productivity levels and 
trends over the period in question? Let’s start with the traditional models, Models 1 
and 2. The first point to note is that the Hatfield dummy variable is large and strongly 
significant in both models, indicating a “Hatfield effect” on unit costs of 39% and 
34% (Models 1 and 2 respectively)61, or a deterioration in productivity of 28% and 
25% respectively. These findings are in line with the results reported in Kennedy and 
Smith (2004). They suggest that the post-Hatfield cost increases reported earlier are 
exceptional when compared with historical precedents, including periods such as the 
1970s, which saw similar levels of track renewal activity to those observed in recent 
years.  
The coefficients on the time trend variables also indicate, alongside the observed 
Hatfield effects, annual TFP growth of approximately 1.4% and 0.7% (for Models 1 
and 2) over the period 1963 to date. The difference in time trend between the models 
is apparently driven by the alternate findings on scale effects reported above. 
Interestingly, it was not possible to identify a significant privatisation effect (in either 
                                                 
60
 Global concavity requires the own partial elasticities of substitution to be negative at all points in the 
sample (or, more precisely, for the matrix of second order derivatives of the cost function - the Hessian 
- to be negative semi-definite throughout). The required properties are satisfied globally in respect of 
labour and capital and materials prices; though are violated for a handful of data points in respect of 
fuel prices. The latter is not considered serious since fuel costs account for less than 5% of total costs 
on average. 
61
 Calculated as EXP (0.3324) and EXP(0.2933)- 1 for the two models.  
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of the two models) separate from the Hatfield effect (the coefficient on a privatisation 
dummy took the expected negative sign, but was not statistically significant).  
This latter finding appears to contrast with the results obtained in Pollitt and Smith 
(2002), where substantial reductions in operating costs were reported for the post-
privatisation, pre-Hatfield period, compared with the counterfactual scenario 
(although the analysis there was not based on econometric methods). However, Figure 
1 shows that total industry costs, like operating costs, were lower during the early 
period after privatisation (covering the period from 1993/94, but before 1999/00). The 
fact that this effect does not show up as statistically significant in the econometric 
results may reflect the relatively small number of post-privatisation, pre-Hatfield data 
points and the large number of variables included in the cost function. Of course, the 
results in Table 7 below do show faster TFP growth after privatisation, although this 
increase reflects a gradual increase in productivity growth over the sample, rather than 
a clear privatisation effect62.  
The results from the renewals model (Model 3) are similar to those of Models 1 
and 2, although the magnitudes of the Hatfield effects and time trends differ (see 
Table 5), with Model 3 suggesting a much lower time trend coefficient (which is also 
statistically insignificant). This finding suggests that part of the (time trend) 
productivity gains reported in Model 2 can be explained by the decline in track 
renewal volumes from the mid 1980s onwards. Likewise, the Hatfield effect is smaller 
than under Model 2 since part of the cost increase post-Hatfield can be explained by 
increased renewal volumes over the period. In this case, a privatisation dummy 
variable shows up as just significant at the 5% level, (negative sign), although its 
inclusion produces some large standard errors and changes to the other coefficients. 
Taking account of Hatfield and time trend effects, Table 7 compares post-Hatfield 
productivity levels for the econometric models (Models 1 to 3) and the Tornqvist 
approach against four earlier periods. These are 1963; the previous track renewal 
boom in the 1970s (represented by 1975)63; the end of the BR period (1992/93)64; and 
the last year before Hatfield (1999/00). Not surprisingly, given the different 
coefficients on the time trend variable (see Table 5), Model 1 indicates significantly 
higher TFP growth over the period 1963 to 1999/00 than Model 2. Furthermore, since 
Model 1 implies broadly constant returns to scale, the Tornqvist productivity results 
are closer to those of Model 1 than Model 2. Appendix 3 shows a comparison of the 
results with previous studies65. 
Based on the preferred model (Model 2), Table 7 shows that the TFP gains 
achieved over the period up to the Hatfield accident (1999/00) have been more than 
wiped out by post-Hatfield falls; leaving TFP in 2001/02 just below 1963 levels. 
                                                 
62
  The inclusion of the LnPL.T and LnPF.T terms in the cost function allows the time trend to vary over 
the sample. 
63
 1975 is the mid-point of the 1970s, and also the peak of the 1970s track renewal boom. 
64
 1992/93 is the last year unaffected by privatisation. See Pollitt and Smith (2002). 
65
 Studies that have reported TFP indices for comparable periods. See Appendix 3 for further details. 
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Model 2 also shows that post-Hatfield productivity levels are lower than during the 
last period of major track renewal in Britain, in the 1970s, by about 8%, and 
considerably lower than in the last year of the BR period, by around 18%. Including 
track renewals into the regression equation (Model 3) produces the same overall 
conclusion (though the magnitudes of the effects differ).  
 
Table 7 
Total Factor Productivity Indicesa
Tornqvist
b
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Index
Start of sample: 1963 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Previous track renewal peak: 1975 116.2 106.5 100.5 129.7
End of BR era: 1992/93 149.3 120.4 104.4 156.6
Last pre-Hatfield year: 1999/00 168.2 129.1 108.0 188.2
Post-Hatfield: 2001/02 125.0 98.3 86.2 139.8
(a) 1963 = 100 for all indices
(b) See section 3 for description of this index. Uses TTM as the single output,
to maintain consistency with the other results
Econometric Models
 
 
 
Meanwhile, Model 1 paints a similar story to that of Models 2 and 3, although the 
end result is that post-Hatfield TFP levels remain higher than at the beginning of the 
sample, putting a slightly more favourable interpretation on productivity performance 
post-Hatfield. This finding is replicated by the Tornqvist index results. Nevertheless, 
Model 1 still suggests that there has been no productivity growth over the last twenty 
years, with the implied post-Hatfield TFP performance equivalent to that achieved as 
long ago as 198066.  
To sum up, the above results show that the sharp cost increases following the 
Hatfield accident are unprecedented when compared against historical benchmarks set 
by British Rail and the early experience of the newly privatised industry (1963 to 
date). Whilst railway costs are clearly influenced by the investment cycle, including 
periods of under-investment, the results show that costs have increased much more 
steeply over the post-Hatfield period than during previous investment peaks in the 
sample (for example, the track renewal boom in the 1970s). 
Taking into account both the Hatfield effects on costs and longer-term TFP trends, 
the preferred models in Table 7 (Models 2 and 3) show that post-Hatfield total factor 
productivity is now lower than at any time over the last four decades. These results 
                                                 
66
 And as long ago as 1983 under the Tornqvist approach. 
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suggest that it is not possible to justify post-Hatfield cost and productivity levels by 
reference to historical precedents, even when fluctuations in track renewal volumes 
are taken into account67. The final part of this section (5.3) considers whether 
improvements in key safety and quality measures can provide part of the explanation / 
justification for higher costs in the post-Hatfield environment. However, we first take 
a brief detour to consider the impact of the 2002/03 Interim Review on the above 
findings. 
 
(c) Relationship with the 2002/03 Interim Review  
 
The previous analysis has shown that productivity levels deteriorated sharply 
following the Hatfield accident and are now (in 2001/02) lower than at any time over 
the four decades covered by this paper. The analysis therefore suggests that the 
industry should be able to reduce costs / improve productivity in future years. In this 
regard, in its 2002/03 Interim Review conclusions the ORR has recently tasked 
Network Rail with achieving efficiency savings of between 30% and 35% over the 
five year period from 2004/05 to 2008/09 (see ORR (2003)). At the overall level, the 
ORR’s conclusions mean that total infrastructure cash costs will fall by 36% over the 
period. 
Whilst these savings are significant, it should be noted that they start from a 
2003/04 infrastructure cost base which is some 27% higher (unit costs 24% higher) 
than in 2001/02, the last year covered by the analysis in this paper. As a result, even if 
Network Rail delivers on the targets set by the ORR, unit infrastructure costs – that is, 
infrastructure costs per train kilometre - will not fall below 2001/02 levels until 
2006/07 (assuming constant traffic levels). On this basis, unit infrastructure costs in 
2008/09 are projected to be roughly 20% below 2001/02 levels, but still 16% higher 
than in the last year before Hatfield (1999/00). Furthermore, Table 4 shows that a 
large proportion of recent industry cost can be attributed to train operating costs. This 
finding therefore suggests that attention to cost trends is required across the whole 
industry – and not just infrastructure.  
 
5.3 Quality, safety and productivity 
 
Three measures have been selected for analysis, based on long-term data availability: 
train performance; broken rails (per train km) and passenger fatalities (per passenger 
km). Train performance represents a measure of output quality, whilst the other two 
are indirect or direct measures of safety (broken rails and passenger fatalities 
respectively). The train performance variable is a composite of the punctuality and 
                                                 
67
 As noted earlier, this result is not materially affected if the post-Hatfield increase in rolling stock 
capital investment is excluded from the cost series. 
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reliability data published by British Rail and the SRA68. The other measures do not 
require further explanation. The data is summarised in Table 8 below69. To our 
knowledge, such a long-time series for two of the three measures (train performance 
and broken rails) has not previously been reported in the literature. 
 
Table 8 
Quality / Safety Measures 
1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 1990s 1990s
Pre-sale Post-sale Post-sale
Pre-HAT
a Post-HAT
Train performance NA 89.4% 87.9% 87.7% 91.0% 81.5%
Broken rails per train km 100 118.4 116.5 102.4 116.7 79.5
(Index: 1969=100)
Passenger fatalities per pass. km 101.4 91.3 79.4 57.6 49.2 26.0
(Index: 1963=100)
(a) HAT=Hatfield. Train performance data from 1975. Broken rails data available from 1969.
Sources: see section 4 and Appendix 2.
 
 
As noted in the introduction to this section, attempts to incorporate these measures 
directly into the total cost function did not produce sensible results, even when lagged 
relationships between the variables were explored70. As a result, the main analysis in 
this part is based on simple observation of the cost / quality / safety data over time. In 
addition, econometric estimation is conducted in order to explore the determinants of 
these key quality / safety variables over the period. The train performance and safety 
measures are discussed in turn below. 
 
(a) Train performance 
 
The full time series for train performance is shown in Figure 3, covering the period 
for which data is available (1975 to 2001/02). It should be noted that the sharp 
increase in the train performance measure in 1996/97 does not result from definitional 
changes (the definitions were changed one year earlier in 1995/9671). This increase 
                                                 
68
 Punctuality measures the proportion of trains running on time, whilst reliability reflects the 
proportion of trains that are cancelled. See section 4 and Appendix 2 for further details. See below for 
further discussion of the impact of changes in definition on the data.  
69
 Note that the last year before privatisation in Table 8 is taken to be 1995/96 – that is, before Railtrack 
and the train operators were privatised. In previous tables in this paper, the last year under British Rail 
is taken to be 1992/93, as some restructuring and sell-offs started from 1993/94.  
70
 This may be the result of collinearity problems, the relatively small sample size and endogeneity 
problems (that is, the quality / safety measures might be considered as endogenous variables – and 
therefore, inclusion of these variables on the right hand side of a cost regression may introduce bias).  
71
 From 1995/96, the punctuality definition changed, so that trains were defined as late if more than 
4.59 late (and 9.59 for InterCity), rather than 5.59 (and 10.59 for InterCity) as before. However, this 
change does not appear to have a major impact on the data. Note also that the 1995/96 change actually 
made it harder for trains to be counted as on-time. There was also a change in definition in 1992/93, 
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represents a genuine improvement, driven largely by reductions in Railtrack-caused 
delays (see Pollitt and Smith (2002)). Railtrack was given very strong incentives to 
improve performance under the incentive regimes put in place at the time of 
privatisation. Of course, the deterioration in post-Hatfield train performance likewise 
represents a genuine deterioration and is not driven by definition changes72.  
 
Figure 3 
Train Performancea
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(a) Composite measure of punctuality and cancellations. Sources: see Appendix 2. 
 
 
 
With the definitional points dealt with, it is clear from Figure 3 and from Table 8 
that improvements in train performance cannot be used to explain higher costs / lower 
productivity in the post-Hatfield environment. Whilst costs have surged during the 
post-Hatfield period, train performance deteriorated sharply in 2000/01 and again in 
2001/02, and has failed to mount a significant recovery since then. Furthermore, 
current performance levels are now lower than at any previous period in the sample.  
There is little else that can be added regarding the cost-quality relationship. 
However, is there more that can be said about the reasons behind the recent sharp 
deterioration in train performance, based on the historical data? Two possible 
explanations are explored here. First of all, it is clear that track renewal activity over 
the post-Hatfield period has been at very high levels compared with the period 
immediately prior to Hatfield. The disruption caused by increased work on the track 
                                                                                                                                            
with data based on services covering Monday to Sunday, rather than Monday to Saturday as 
previously. However, this change does not appear to have impacted significantly on the data, with the 
composite performance measure continuing an upward trend established in earlier years.  
 29
may be a driver of recent performance falls. Secondly, traffic density (measured as 
passenger train kilometres per track kilometre) was also higher in 2001/02 than at any 
point during the period 1975 to 2001/02, and this factor would again be expected to 
impact negatively on train performance. 
Table 9 presents the results of regressing train performance on both traffic density 
and track renewals per track kilometre (all in logs). The results for Model A show that 
the coefficients on the density and track renewals variables take the expected negative 
signs, and that these variables are also statistically significant73. However, Model B 
shows that these effects cease to be significant once a Hatfield dummy variable is 
included. Overall, the econometric results therefore suggest that recent performance 
falls are dominated by unexplained Hatfield effects, and that changes in traffic density 
and track renewal volumes do not have a statistically significant impact on 
performance when modelled alongside a Hatfield dummy variable.  
 
Table 9 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Train Performance) 
Coefficient t ratio Coefficient t ratio
Constant 0.342 2.503 -0.185 -0.756
Ln (Pass. train km per track km) -0.157 -3.134 0.023 0.266
Ln (Track Renewals per track km) -0.036 -2.877 0.004 0.218
Hatfield effect dummy variable
a -0.093 -2.491
R
2 
statistic 0.346 0.485
(a) Takes the value unity in 2000/01 and 2001/02; zero elsewhere, since
the main deterioration in performance took place in 2000/01.
Model A Model B
 
 
 
Of course, as discussed further below, the recent deterioration in train performance 
may have been caused, in part, by a shift in the industry’s priorities in favour of asset 
condition and safety measures, at the expense of keeping the trains running on time. 
In this regard it should be noted that the number of temporary speed restrictions on the 
network has remained high throughout the post-Hatfield period, relative to previous 
years (averaging 537 in 2002/03, compared with between 250 and 300 during the 
early years after privatisation)74. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
72
 As noted in section 4 and Appendix 2, the change in definition of services covered by the PPM – 
which would otherwise affect the comparison after 1999/00 - has been corrected for.  
73
 The results in Table 9 are based on a log-linear model. The linear equivalent gives similar results. 
74
 See Booz-Allen & Hamilton (1999) and Network Rail (2003).  
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(b) Safety measures 
 
Whilst post-Hatfield cost increases cannot be justified based on train performance 
data, which has deteriorated, the analysis now turns to consider whether the recent 
cost rises can be explained by improvements in rail safety? One measure of rail safety 
is the number of broken rails. Over the last thirty or so years this measure has 
fluctuated around an average of roughly 740 per year (see Figure 4). However, in 
1998/99 and 1999/00, broken rails started to rise considerably, and this increase 
prompted the ORR to set new targets for Railtrack. The Hatfield accident - itself 
caused by a broken rail - further heightened concerns over the condition of the 
network, and the number of broken rails subsequently improved sharply over the next 
two years, with further improvements continuing under Network Rail.  
The reduction in the number of broken rails was achieved alongside improvements 
in other asset condition measures (for example track geometry). The data therefore 
does appear to suggest a link between improved asset condition and increased cost 
over the post-Hatfield period. The number of broken rails has now been reduced way 
below the long-term average. Indeed, the econometric results presented in Table 1075 
suggest that there is a clear, negative Hatfield effect on the number broken rails 
(although broken rails had started to fall prior to Hatfield – see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4 
Number of Broken Rails and Broken Rails 
per Train Kilometre (Index: 1969=100) 
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75
 The results in Table 10 are based on a log-linear model. The linear model produces similar results. 
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Table 10 
Ordinary Least Squares 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Broken Rails per Track Kilometre) 
Coefficient t ratio
Constant -0.191 -0.468
Ln Passenger train density
a 0.484 2.456
Ln Freight tonne density
a 0.221 1.194
Hatfield effect dummy variable
b -0.425 -3.086
R
2 
statistic 0.265
(a) Expressed per track km
(b) Takes the value 0.5 in 2000/01 and unity in 2001/02,
as in the cost function estimation described above
 
 
 
It should be noted that broken rails and other asset condition measures are indirect 
measures of rail safety. Improvements in the quality of track should, over time, be 
reflected in reduced numbers of accidents and fatalities. However, the historical data 
shows that few serious rail accidents in Britain have been caused by rail breaks. As a 
result, the reduction in broken rails seen in recent years may not have achieved much 
in terms of reduced accident risk, although it may have improved perceptions about 
safety on the railways. Of course, improved asset condition may be desirable in its 
own right, apart from its impact on safety, although it is questionable whether the 
recent improvements - so far in excess of long-term average levels  - are really 
required. 
Before turning to look at actual data on passenger fatalities, it is informative to 
consider an alternative indicator of accident risk on Britain’s railways – namely 
SPADs (signals passed at danger). Although it has not been possible to obtain 
comparable data over the longer-term, recent trends suggest that this measure has also 
improved substantially in recent years. SPADs per train kilometre fell by 55% 
between 1994/95 and 2001/02, with the majority of this improvement achieved over 
the period 1998/99 to 2001/02. Here again, the data suggests a link between increased 
spending and reduced accident risk, as the recent improvements reflect, in part, 
substantial investment in TPWS (the Train Protection and Warning System)76; 
although it should be noted that SPADs were falling prior to the installation of TPWS. 
Figure 5 charts the number of passenger fatalities per passenger kilometre over the 
period 1963 to 2001/02. The data shows that the number of passenger fatalities (in 
absolute terms, and per passenger kilometre) has declined since the Hatfield accident. 
It is therefore possible that the recent attention to safety and asset condition measures, 
and the associated increase in expenditure, may already have led to reduced numbers 
of passenger fatalities - although it is too early to draw firm conclusions based on just 
two years data. Econometric analysis of the determinants of passenger fatalities 
                                                 
76
 This was fully implemented by the end of 2003, as required by the 1999 Railway Safety Regulations. 
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produced little of interest in this regard77. Of course, Evans (2000 and 2002) has 
separately argued that, based on the data available so far, the reduction in fatal train 
accidents since privatisation (and extending beyond Hatfield) should be viewed as a 
continuation of a long-term downward trend in accidents78. 
 
Figure 5 
Passenger Fatalities per Passenger Kilometre 
(Index: 1963=100) 
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To sum up, the above data and discussion suggests that the sharp cost increases 
observed during the post-Hatfield period have been associated with improved safety 
on Britain’s railways. Broken rails fell sharply between 1999/00 and 2001/02, and the 
econometric results show that this can clearly be identified as a Hatfield effect (see 
Table 10; although some progress in bringing broken rails down was being made prior 
to Hatfield as noted above). Meanwhile SPADs have fallen substantially, driven, in 
part, by the rolling out of TPWS across the network. Finally, the number of passenger 
fatalities has also fallen, although more data is required to determine whether this 
represents a Hatfield effect, or merely a continuation of previous long-term trends.  
                                                 
77
 Given the sharp annual fluctuations in passenger fatality data, the econometric work was carried out 
based on five year moving average data, thus precluding analysis of Hatfield effects, which relate only 
to two years. The results suggested that variations in passenger fatalities over this period have been 
dominated by time trend effects, as Evans (2000 and 2002) also suggests.  
78
 Although Evans does note a possible increase in the number of fatalities per accident in recent years. 
Evans argues that it is reasonable to put this increase down to chance, until further data becomes 
available. It may also reflect increased numbers of passengers per train, as train crowding has worsened 
in recent years. 
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Of course, if recent cost increases have indeed led to improvements in rail safety, it 
is important to ask whether these safety improvements are worth it from a cost-benefit 
perspective. The analysis now turns to consider this question.  
 
(c) Cost-benefit analysis of post-Hatfield safety gains 
 
In order to compute the benefits of any safety improvements resulting from Hatfield, 
some measure of the associated reduction in passenger fatalities is needed. One option 
would be to base the calculation on the reduction in passenger fatalities between 
1999/00 and 2001/02. However, such a calculation would be distorted by peaks in the 
data caused by individual incidents (for example, the Ladbroke Grove disaster in 
1999/00, in which 31 people died). Table 11 therefore considers two comparisons.  
First, the average number of fatalities over the post-Hatfield years (2000/01 and 
2001/02) is compared with the average over the previous ten years (1990/91 to 
1999/00). This reduction in fatalities is translated into a value to society using the 
VPF79 figures published by the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB). The RSSB 
puts the value of a rail fatality (or multiple fatalities) at £3.35m per equivalent 
fatality80. Of course this comparison suffers from the problem that it is based on only 
two years of post-Hatfield data. To supplement the first calculation, Table 11 
therefore also shows the value to society of eliminating passenger fatalities altogether, 
based on the average number of fatalities over the ten years from 1990/91 to 1999/00. 
 
Table 11 
Societal Value of Reducing Passenger Fatalitiesa 
Base data
Average annual number of passenger fatalities: 1990/91 to 1999/00 (pre-Hatfield) 28.0
Average annual number of passenger fatalities: 2000/01 to 2001/02 (post-Hatfield) 15.5
Societal values of reducing passenger fatalities (2001/02 prices)
Post-Hatfield reduction in annual fatalities (28 per year to 15.5 per year) £42m
Reducing annual fatalities to zero (28 per year to zero per year) £94m
Costs
Hatfield effect on annual industry cash costs £2,122m
b
(a) Based on a value of preventing a fatality (VPF) of £3.35m per equivalent fatality
(multiple or rail fatality). 
(b) Based on applying the Hatfield effect (Model 2) of 34% to the cost base in 
1999/00 (see Table 4).
 
 
 
Table 11 shows that the social welfare benefit of the post-Hatfield reduction in 
passenger fatalities (£42m) is dwarfed by the Hatfield effect on industry costs 
                                                 
79
 Value of preventing a fatality. 
80
 See Railway Group Safety Plan 2001/02, published by Railway Safety. 
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(£2.1bn)81, with the data implying a cost per life saved of approximately £168m. 
Furthermore, even if passenger fatalities were cut to zero, the resulting improvement 
in social welfare (£94m) would still be well short of the £2.1bn increase in cost. The 
data in Table 11 therefore suggests that if recent cost increases have been driven 
predominantly by safety improvements - rather than straightforward reductions in 
productivity - the cost of these improvements far outweighs the benefits. It also 
implies that the extra money being pumped into railways would be better spent on 
road safety improvements, or possibly other areas of the public sector, such as the 
National Health Service (NHS).  
To complete this section, it should also be noted that the preceding discussion 
highlights the stark contrast between performance and safety trends in the post-
Hatfield era. It could be argued that the regulatory, political and legal environment in 
which the railways currently operate has created a culture of risk aversion that 
produces “too much” safety, at the expense of performance. Rail accidents make 
headline news and senior executives face lengthy follow-up enquiries, as well as the 
threat of manslaughter charges, which may have a greater impact on management 
incentives than the financial payments underpinning the performance regimes – 
particularly following the loss of Railtrack equity incentives after October 200182.  
A key question facing policy makers is whether there is a case for refocusing 
effort and resources away from safety towards dealing with performance issues, and if 
so, how the framework of incentives should be set to encourage delivery of this 
change in priorities. Of course, since improved rail performance would have the effect 
of taking passengers off the roads – which are less safe - such a change in policy 
should actually reduce fatalities on the two modes overall (although this effect might 
be offset, to some extent, by the diversion of traffic to the even safer mode of air 
transport). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The privatisation of British Rail has been the source of much controversy over the 
eight years of private sector ownership, particularly after the sharp increase in costs 
following the Hatfield accident. The objective of this paper was to construct total rail 
industry costs over the post-privatisation period, and then assess post-Hatfield cost 
and productivity levels against the historical precedents set by British Rail and also 
the early experience of the newly privatised industry (1963 to date). Rail industry 
productivity levels and trends for the post-Hatfield period have not previously been 
reported in the literature. 
                                                 
81
 See note (b) to Table 11. This figure is lower than the £2.9bn increase in costs shown in Table 4, 
since part of the cost rises are explained by the variables in the cost function regression analysis 
presented in section 5.2 above (e.g. traffic growth). 
82
 After the company was placed into administration. 
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The paper reports a number of interesting findings. First of all, the data shows that 
annual industry cash costs have risen by £2.9bn in real terms since the Hatfield 
accident, an increase of 47% (or a unit cost rise of 40%). Perhaps more surprisingly, 
the data also shows that TOC costs account for 38% of the total industry cost rise 
since Hatfield, of which about half comes from increases in the basic cost of running 
passenger train services. Taken together, passenger and freight operator costs account 
for 42% of the industry cost rise over the post-Hatfield period. 
The econometric results show that the sharp cost rises following the Hatfield 
accident are unprecedented when compared against historical benchmarks. Whilst 
railway costs are clearly influenced by the investment cycle, including periods of 
under-investment, the results show that costs have risen much more steeply over the 
post-Hatfield period than during previous investment peaks – including the track 
renewal boom in the 1970s. In terms of comparative productivity levels, the indices 
for the preferred models show that post-Hatfield cost rises have more than wiped out 
the TFP gains achieved over the previous four decades (though slightly more 
favourable results are given by some of the other models). It is therefore not possible 
to justify post-Hatfield cost and productivity levels by reference to historical 
precedents, even when fluctuations in the investment cycle are taken into account.  
Furthermore, preliminary data for 2002/03 and 2003/04 indicates that industry 
costs have continued to rise sharply since the last year of the sample used in the 
analysis (2001/02). In other words, the true picture of post-Hatfield cost and 
productivity performance may be even worse than suggested by the results presented 
in this paper. However, a lack of external benchmark information means that the 
industry’s regulators have so far struggled to successfully challenge these cost rises. 
The paper has also considered whether improvements in quality /safety might be 
used to explain recent cost increases. Unfortunately, higher costs after Hatfield have 
not resulted in better train performance relative to historic data – quite the reverse. On 
the other hand, it would appear that the post-Hatfield environment has been associated 
with improvements in direct and indirect measures of rail safety. However, to the 
extent that improved safety is the cause of higher railway costs, it is clear that the 
implied investment in safety easily fails the cost-benefit test. This finding suggests 
that the current regulatory, legal and political environment may have led to an 
excessive focus on safety, without due regard to cost considerations or the 
implications for punctuality.  
Of course, whilst safety considerations appear to have played a role in driving up 
costs in recent years, there may be other factors impacting on recent cost and 
productivity trends. The decision to place Railtrack into administration, and replace it 
with a not-for-dividend company, may have weakened incentives for cost control at a 
critical time for the industry. Alternatively, part of the explanation may lie in higher 
maintenance and renewal contractor profits, although this is considered unlikely for 
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the reasons outlined earlier83. On the train operation side, incentives to contain costs 
may have been impacted by the franchise renewal process (delays and changes in 
policy), as well as by the SRA’s approach to bailing out failing TOCs. The impact of 
the new, more tightly-defined franchise agreements on TOC incentives remains to be 
seen. Further research is required in this area.  
Whatever the causes of the recent deterioration in rail productivity, the results 
suggest that the industry should be able to achieve significant productivity gains in the 
future. Whilst the ORR has tasked Network Rail with achieving substantial efficiency 
savings over the period 2004/05 to 2008/09, these reductions start from an 
infrastructure cost base (2003/04) that is 27% higher than in 2001/02 (the last year 
covered by the analysis in this paper). This means that, even if Network Rail delivers 
on these targets, infrastructure costs per train kilometre will not fall below 2001/02 
levels until 2006/07; and the projections show that costs are not projected to return to 
pre-Hatfield levels over the period of Network Rail’s Business Plan (to 2013/14). 
It should also be noted that the ORR’s expenditure allowances have been prepared 
on the assumption that Network Rail continues to further improve key asset condition 
and safety measures. The level of infrastructure cost savings could therefore be higher 
were this not the case.  Furthermore, given that the costs of train operation have also 
increased sharply post-Hatfield, it is clear that pressure needs to be brought to bear on 
costs across the whole industry and not just infrastructure. It remains to be seen what 
impact the current government review of the rail industry will have on the industry’s 
priorities as between cost, safety and punctuality. 
We suggest three key areas for future research. First, it is important to obtain a 
greater understanding of the costs and benefits of the safety requirements and 
practices on Britain’s railways. This proposed work is likely to require analysis at a 
considerably more disaggregated level than has been attempted in the present 
discussion. Second, one of the key issues facing policy makers is the fact that we still 
do not know where Britain’s railways stand relative to international comparators. The 
development of a robust international benchmarking framework should therefore be a 
priority going forward, particularly given the fact that overseas comparisons offer 
(potentially) the only way of justifying current cost levels. Finally, further work is 
required to understand the reasons behind recent sharp increases in train operating 
costs (as TOC costs have received considerably less attention than infrastructure costs 
in the recent rail policy debate). 
                                                 
83
 Even if contractor profits have increased, driven perhaps by capacity constraints and insufficient 
competition between companies, the associated rise in Railtrack / Network Rail costs, and ultimately 
government subsidies, is unlikely to represent good value for money for taxpayers. Note that in 2003, 
Network Rail announced its decision to bring all maintenance activities in-house.  
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Appendix 1 
Comparison of British Rail Depreciation Data:  
BR Accounts Versus UIC  
£m (current prices) 89/90 90/91 91/92 91/92 
Re-
stated 
92/93 93/94 
BR accounts       
Depreciation charge 130 150 179 287 270 292 
Capital grant charge to P&L 79 95 209 -161 -172 -192 
Sum of the above 209 245 388 126 98 100 
       
UIC data       
Depreciation charge 209 245 179 NA 98 100 
       
Sources: BR Annual Report and Accounts; UIC International Railway Statistics. 
 
 
From 1978, the BR accounts show that capital grants received from the government 
were reflected as revenue in the profit and loss account (P&L), with an equal and 
offsetting charge reflected in costs (so that the capital grant had a neutral impact on 
the P&L). The capital grant was then added to the capital reserve in the balance sheet. 
In the UIC accounts the capital grant is (incorrectly) added to the depreciation charge, 
and the UIC data therefore overstates the level of depreciation. From 1991/92, the 
accounting policy changed, with the capital grant no longer shown in turnover (only 
the revenue grant was included in turnover). Instead, the capital grant was added to 
reserves in the balance sheet and then released to the P&L as a negative cost over the 
lives of the assets. Once again the UIC (incorrectly) includes this negative figure in 
the depreciation charge for Britain and therefore understates the level of depreciation 
from 1991/92 onwards. 
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Appendix 2 
Supplementary Information on  
Data Sources and Assumptions 
Data 
 
Source Assumptions 
Post-Hatfield cost 
adjustments  
 
 
 
 
Annual reports of 
privatised 
companies84 
(1996/97 to 
2001/02); 
 
ATOC Press 
Release (February 
2001); 
 
SRA Annual Report 
(2001/02). 
As noted in section 4, a number of adjustments were 
made to the post-Hatfield cost data to reflect the large 
intra-industry payments over this period. For some of 
these items, and for some TOCs, the accounting 
treatment is not explicitly identified in the relevant TOC 
accounts. In these cases assumptions were made based 
on the practice of other TOCs and also access charge 
revenue data provided by Network Rail. Where not 
stated explicitly in the TOC accounts, compensation 
from Railtrack to TOCs is assumed to be included in 
TOC accounts as a negative cost85, whilst TOC penalty 
payments, Clause 18.1, and passenger compensation are 
assumed to be included as negative revenue. These 
assumptions were verified following discussions with 
National Express Group. 
 
Section 4 also made reference to a figure of £590m 
provided for in the Railtrack accounts in 2000/01, in 
respect of compensation to train operators. Note, 
however, that not all of the £590m was actually paid. 
The amount actually paid is used in the analysis here. 
 
As part of the 2000 Periodic Review, track access 
charges were reduced. Clause 18.1 of the TOC 
Franchise Agreements mean that TOCs are held neutral 
in respect of such changes, and therefore in aggregate 
TOCs were required to make payments to the SRA 
(Clause 18.1 payments referred to in section 4). 
 
Volume and quality 
measures 
 
 
 
British Rail Annual 
Reports; National 
Rail Trends (SRA);  
Transport Statistics 
Great Britain; 
Network Rail; 
Health and Safety 
Executive. 
 
The composite train performance measure referred to in 
Table 3 is calculated as punctuality less (1-reliability).  
For the period after 1999/00 – when punctuality and 
reliability reporting was replaced by the SRA’s own 
combined measure (the Public Performance Measure, or 
PPM) - the composite measure used in this paper is 
constructed based on the change in the SRA’s PPM 
measure. This is possible because the PPM is published 
alongside punctuality / reliability (1997/98 to 1999/00). 
 
 
                                                 
84
 TOCs, EWS, Freightliner, three rolling stock companies and Railtrack / Network Rail.  
85
 With the exception of Charter compensation and compensation for disruption resulting from large 
projects (e.g. West Coast Mainline), which is generally shown as other income in TOC accounts. 
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Appendix 3 
Comparison with Results of Previous Studies 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Tornqvist Bishop & Cowie 
Thompson (2002)
(1992)
1970s 1.3% 0.6% 0.1% 0.7% -1.7% -0.2%
1980s 1.5% 0.7% 0.2% 2.3% 1.2% 3.8%
1970 to 1990 1.4% 0.7% 0.2% 1.5% -0.3% 1.8%
(a) Note that in the case of Cowie (2002), the 1970s TFP growth rate covers the 
period 1972 to 1980.
Present study Previous studies
a
Annual average TFP growth rates
 
 
The results in the above table show some differences between the findings reported in 
this paper and those reported for the previous studies shown (these are the only 
studies from Tables 1 and 2 that explicitly report TFP growth rates for comparable 
periods). However, as noted in section 2, the previous approaches shown above use 
track kilometres to represent the capital input and are therefore not suited to 
addressing the problems under consideration in this paper, which is concerned, inter 
alia, with track investment and condition. Furthermore, it is not clear that these studies 
have adequately dealt with the accounting problems discussed in section 2. In any 
case, neither of the studies shown above report (total system) railway productivity 
measures beyond 1990, and therefore do not shed light on questions concerning post-
Hatfield productivity levels. 
In particular, it should be noted that the differing results for the 1970s are probably 
caused by the change in accounting policy in 1975, referred to in section 2. From 
1975, track renewals were charged to the P&L (previously they were capitalised). 
TFP measures based on labour inputs, other costs and track mileage - as used in 
Bishop and Thompson (1992) and Cowie (2002) - will therefore record this change as 
a deterioration in TFP, since the rise in other costs will not be offset by any change in 
the capital input. However, the approach in this paper would not observe any change 
in TFP, since the total cost measure used is invariant to changes in accounting policy. 
As noted in Pollitt and Smith (2002), previous studies may have overstated 
productivity growth during the 1980s due to the substantial asset sales undertaken 
during that period86.  
                                                 
86
 See page 481. 
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